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Abstract 
The paper introduces an order statistic, Approximate Entropy (ApEn), to investigate the 
presence of speculative bubbles in the equity market. In contrast to the traditional 
duration dependence test, the paper using Approximate Entropy examines three major 
events of stock market crash in US, Japan, and India. In addition, the paper also 
investigates the 1997 Asian crisis using weekly data from seven major Asian indices 
which includes Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Japan. 
The evidences presented in this study show that there are strong “tale-tell” signs which 
point to a substantially lower level of ApEn during these crash events. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
               The stock market has often been considered as a primary indicator and a 
barometer of performance of the entire economy due to its sensitivity to the various 
economic activities. Among others one of the most important functions of the stock 
market is to facilitate and encourage capital accumulation by channeling short-term 
savings into long-term investments and to allocate limited capital to the most valued 
social usage. The stock prices of an efficient market would hence provide accurate 
signals for optimal resource allocation in the economy.  
 
The efficient market theory assumes that investors in the market are rational. 
However, the stock market is often influenced by speculative activities that break down 
this very assumption that investors always behave rationally. A simple example as in 
the case of ‘herd mentality’ explains the fact that investors do act irrationally and 
occasionally succumb to psychological factors that may lead them to believe that they 
could earn higher returns, even if their actions might not be considered rational. 
Therefore, when the market starts being driven by speculation, prices of assets may 
increase unexpectedly to high levels pushing it much beyond the fundamental values 
leading to a speculative bubble. 
         A speculative bubble describes a condition of consistent market overvaluation 
wherein though the prices of certain assets deviate from their deemed fundamental 
values yet the investors continue to believe that with high probability the bubble will 
continue and yield a substantially higher return to compensate the odd of a crash 
(Kindlerbeger, 1978). Further, when bubbles occur, price increases lead to successively 
larger increases and as the price reaches a barrier when there can be no further price 
increase to sustain the demand for the asset, the bubble bursts and the price drops 
sharply, thus leading to a market crash. In other words, the speculative bubbles are 
characterized by a situation wherein the investors continue to buy an over valued asset 
as they anticipate the expansion of the bubble will ensure a greater probability of 
earning abnormally high returns. This explains the rationality of remaining in the 
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market despite the overvaluation as the higher return earned is expected to compensate 
the investors for the probability of a crash.  
           Various techniques have been employed to capture the presence of bubbles. 
Perhaps the earliest techniques include tests for excess volatility that were employed by 
Friedman (1953), Baumol (1957), Kohn (1978); Shiller (1981). Other techniques used 
were tests for bubble premiums by Hardouvelis (1988), Rappoport and White (1993). 
Test for non-stationarity and cointegration developed by Diba and Grossman (1988) also 
gained importance in the following years. These techniques however are criticized for 
their low predictive power and their limitations in the study of speculative bubbles.  
          In recent times, the duration dependence models have emerged as important 
technique to study the speculative bubble. In contrast to many traditional tests that look 
for autocorrelation, skewness and kurtosis to identify bubble, the duration dependence 
models derived by McQueen and Thorley (1994), provide more discriminatory power by 
testing for nonlinearity inherent in returns due to bubbles.  
As an alternative to the duration based approach this paper develops and introduces order 
statistic known as Approximate Entropy to investigate the presence of speculative 
bubbles in the equity market for a sample of moderately large number of countries 
encompassing both developing and developed economies. The paper adds value to the 
existing literature in three primary ways. First the paper introduces Approximate Entropy 
(ApEn), a widely used measure in statistical physics to test the special empirical 
properties of rational speculative bubble during three known episodes of crash across the 
various markets like U.S, Japan, and India respectively. The Approximate Entropy 
(ApEn) proposed by Pincus et al (1991, 2004), has been used in this article to quantify 
the likelihood of “order” (repetitiveness) in the financial time series. The three episodes 
of crash considered in the paper involve the US crash in October 1997, the Japan crash in 
December 1989, and January 2007-08 crash in India. Apart from these episodes we also 
examine the existence of rational speculative bubble during the Asian crisis in 1997.  
Second, most of the empirical studies investigating the speculative bubbles have 
primarily focused on developed countries. Ironically, assumptions underlying the 
efficiency hypothesis are more likely to be violated in the case of developing economies 
than their developed counterparts due to the poor legal and information systems. 
Therefore, the study of speculative bubbles has gained renewed importance in the context 
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of developing economies. Despite significant developments, which have put these 
markets almost at par with the best in the world (in terms of their structure, systems and 
regulation), the markets still have witnessed several bouts of speculative activities in 
recent times. However, not many of the existing studies have addressed the issue whether 
the price behavior in many developing markets is consistent with the characteristics of 
bubbles. Therefore, this paper is a first step towards testing the speculative bubble for a 
developing economy like India. Particularly in India there have been innumerable 
speculations about the existence of bubbles in the stock market. In addition to these 
speculative activities, the Indian stock market has also witnessed various scams and 
crises leading to irrational price behaviour over the last decade and hence provides a 
unique opportunity to test the power of ApEn in identifying irregular market movements.  
       
Finally, apart from its contribution to the sparse empirical work, the findings of the paper 
also provide a valuable policy implication for many developing and emerging countries 
which are vulnerable to speculative bubble. The paper, therefore, attempts to suggest an 
early warning system to detect the emergence of bubbles and thereby correct any 
persisting anomalies in the market. The paper also carries out a series of robustness 
checks for the findings revealed through this study. 
      
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 presents the methodology and 
the data used in the paper. Section 3 summarizes the results using ApEn. The paper’s 
conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
 
2. DATA AND METHEDOLOGY 
 
2.1 Empirical Model:  
 In a simple rational speculative bubble model Shiller (1978) and Blanchard and 
Watson (1982) have argued that the market price of a stock can deviate from its 
fundamental values under a speculative rational bubble episode so long as the bubble 
grows at a specific rate. Defining the expected return of a stock as Et(Rt+1) = (Pt+1 – Pt )/Pt 
, where Pt is the price at time t and Et denotes the expectation given the information set at 
time t, in an efficient market condition require that a stock’s expected  return equals  its 
required rate of return (rt) i.e. Et(Rt+1) = (rt +1). In other words, the competitive 
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equilibrium condition requires current price to be equal to the expected future price 
discounted by the required rate of return, i.e. Pt= Et(Pt+1)/(1+ rt+1).  Further, Shiller (1978) 
and Blanchard and Watson (1982) and West (1987) among others observed that any price 
of the form Pt= Pt*+ bt , where Et(bt+1)=(1+ rt+1)bt , is also a solution to equilibrium 
condition. Therefore, the market price of a stock can deviate from its fundamental value 
by a rational bubble factor bt, so long the bubble factor grows at the required rate of 
return (rt).  
Blanchard and Watson (1982) and McQueen and Thorley (1994) offer a rational 
speculative bubble process that allows the bubble to grow and burst with bubble 
satisfying following condition:  
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In other words, in this process bubble grows by the exact amount needed to offset the loss 
due to a crash with probability (1-π).  It is important to note that the model proposed by 
Blanchard and others suggest a bubble with a long run-up in price followed by a crash 
with π >1/2.   
 
 
2.2 Methodology  
The first rational speculative bubble model was introduced by McQueen and 
Thorley (1994) in which they suggested that bubbles lead to explosive price changes 
which grow each period that it survives. Therefore, they hypothesized that a long run of 
positive abnormal returns suggests the presence of a bubble if the conditional probability 
of the run ending is a decreasing function of the duration of the run. 2 In other words, in 
the rational bubbles, stock prices should deviate from random walk and show evidence of 
long duration runs of either positive or negative abnormal returns. In this paper we follow 
the basic argument of the traditional duration dependence test as proposed by McQueen 
                                                 
2 Since bubbles cannot be negative there is no such restriction placed on runs of negative abnormal returns 
(McQueen and Thorley, 1994).  
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and Thorley (1994), but deploy a new measure of “order” to test the speculative bubble 
hypothesis.  
The paper introduces Approximate Entropy (ApEn) as a measure of regularity 
statistic in order to test speculative bubble in stock markets.  The Approximate Entropy 
estimates the likelihood that “similar” patterns of observations will not be followed by 
additional “similar” trends. Therefore any time series that contains many repetitive 
patterns has a relatively small ApEn value when compared to more random ones. This 
particular ability to trace repetitive patterns in time series has been exploited by the paper 
to identify the speculative bubble in the data.       
The approximate entropy was introduced by Pincus et al (1991, 1997 and 2004) to 
quantify the creation of information in a time series. Though initially developed for 
measuring the irregularities of a complex nonlinear system, it has been gradually 
introduced into finance literature as a measure of market efficiency for both stock and 
foreign exchange market (Pincus et al, 2004, and Oh et al 2006). However, the paper for 
the first time attempts to use this statistics to test for speculative rational bubble in the 
stock markets.        
The following section provides a brief summary of algorithm to estimate ApEn for a time 
series of stock index data. Given a sequence SN, containing N absolute returns from index 
series (Si), Ui= Si+1-Si, two input parameters are defined such as, m, r to compute ApEn 
(SN, m, r), where m defines the pattern length and r reflects the similarity criterion.       
To compute the approximate entropy, ApEn, of a time series SN , first the series of 
vectors of length m, v(n)=[U(n), U(n+1),...U(n+m-1)]T is derived from the signal sample 
S(n).  The distance D(i,j) between two vectors v(i) and v(j) is defined as the maximum 
difference in the scalar components of v(i) and v(j). Then Nm,r(i), i.e., the number of 
vectors j (with j N-m+1) such that the distance between the vectors v(j) and the generic 
vector v(i) (with  i N-m+1) is lower than r,  D(i,j) r, is computed where r reflects the 
similarity criterion. The probability, Cm,r(i), to find a vector which differs from v(i) less 
than the distance r, is defined as:  
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ApEn is given by:  
rmrmrm FFApEn ,1,, +−=  
 
Therefore, ApEn of a time series SN measures the logarithmic likelihood that runs of 
patterns of length m that are close to each other will remain close in the next incremental 
comparisons, m+1. And hence the fact that a greater likelihood of remaining close (high 
regularity) produces smaller ApEn values (low regularity produces higher ApEn values), 
has been exploited to test the presence of rational speculative bubble in this paper. 
Extant empirical literature contends that market during bubble would experience 
long runs of similar patterns of returns during the growing and the deflating phases of 
bubble. Most of the existing duration dependence models exploit these patterns through a 
testable hypothesis of negative duration in runs of positive abnormal returns (Mc Queen 
and Thorley, 1994). Following this, the paper argues that in the presence of a rational 
speculative bubble the return shows runs of repetitive patterns both before and after the 
crash, thereby leaving a “tell tale” sign in the return series. Therefore, the paper 
hypothesizes that an episode of rational speculative bubble should be associated with 
relatively low values of ApEn when compared to the average historical value. The paper 
develops several measures to observe the characteristic of ApEn during the crash periods. 
The first measure of rational speculative bubble involves testing an empirical pattern in 
ApEn using a 12 weeks discrete windows of returns data. In these tests, a low level of 
ApEn during specific episode of crash would provide a “tell tale” signs of speculative 
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bubbles in the data. The second measure involves a yearly measure to examine the 
empirical patters in ApEn before, during and after the crash.                  
 
2.2 DATA 
 
The paper tries to develop an alternative statistical measure to traditional duration 
dependence test in order to analyze speculative bubble across multiple countries. We 
investigate the speculative bubble for multiple episodes of market crashes which includes 
the US crash in October 1997, the Japan crash in December 1989, and 2007 crash in 
India. Apart from these episodes we also examine the claims of rational speculative 
bubble during the Asian crisis for Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and South Korea in 1997. For this purpose the weekly data of the primary stock market 
from the respective countries have been used for the paper. Since the purpose of the paper 
is to study the crash, pre and post crash period data have also been analyzed. Usually the 
decade of the crash has been identified as the sample period for our study. More 
specifically, for the crash in the US, Japan, and India, we have considered the weekly 
data for 1981-90, 1984-1994, 1998-2008 respectively. Further to study the Asian crisis 
we have considered the weekly data for 1991-2003, except Malaysia which has data for 
1994-2003.   
     
As argued by McQueen and Thorley (1994), our choice of weekly data over daily data is 
based on the fact that the findings of bubble could be contaminated by the high signal-to-
noise ratio in daily returns. On the other hand, weekly returns may be appropriate over 
other alternative of monthly tests as it may lack power given the relatively short data 
series used in the study. 
 
Once the time series is determined, we have considered the incremental series, Si+1-Si and 
several alternatives such as [(Si+1/Si)-1] and the log-ratio series [ln (Si+1/Si)], to estimate 
the ApEn. Since findings of the paper are robust to these alternatives, we report only the 
results for the incremental series.  
In this paper, the ApEn is estimated with embedding dimension, m = 2 and the similarity 
measure, r = 20% of the standard deviation of the time series, similar to the previous 
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work (Pincus et al 2004). To test the robustness of our findings several values of m and r 
are attempted. However, as our finding remains invariant to different choices of m and r, 
we report only ApEn (2, 20) following the convention.   
 
3. RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Observations 
Table 1 and 2 provide the preliminary descriptive statistics of return data during the crash 
decades.  Descriptive statistics presented suggest some signs of irregularities in the data:  
First, the negative significant skewness, with a few exceptions (Japan, Malaysia and 
Singapore) suggesting unusually large negative returns associated with crash is often 
considered as a tell-tale sign of bubble in observed returns. Second, consistent with the 
fat tail due to the mixing of distribution as the bubble grows, all the stock returns are 
leptokurtic. Finally, the rational speculative bubble often suggests a strong positive 
autocorrelation due to the fact that returns tend to be positive as the bubble grows.  For 
weekly returns statistics presented in tables 1 and 2 suggest a significant autocorrelation 
for several sample periods indicating further tell-tale sign for speculative bubble in the 
data.  
However, as these return characteristics such as autocorrelation, skewness, or kurtosis 
can also be attributed to other anomalies, we need a more discriminatory statistics to 
provide more reliable evidence for bubbles3. Therefore, the paper introduces ApEn as an 
alternative statistic to analyze speculative bubble in the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For example, time-varying risk premiums (e.g. Fama and French, 1988), and non-synchronous trading 
(e.g. Lo and MacKinlay, 1990a) could also induce autocorrelation while skewness could result from 
asymmetric fundamental news.  Further, the leptokurtosis in stock return could be a consequence of arrival 
of information in batches (e.g. Tauchen and Pitts, 1983). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of weekly log returns on national stock indexes. 
Returns SENSEX
(1998-2007) 
S&P 500
(1981-1990) 
Hang Seng 
(1991-2000) 
Nikkei
(1989-1998) 
T ( No of weekly Return) 522 521 521 519 
Mean 0.0014 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0005 
Standard Deviation 0.0152 0.0096 0.0166 0.0127 
Skewness -0.3736 -0.5761 -0.5363 0.0912 
(SE) derived as (6/T)1/2 0.1072 0.1073 0.1073 0.1075 
Excess-Kurtosis 4.7468 6.418 5.7643 4.3522 
(SE) derived as (24/T)1/2 0.2144 0.2146 0.2146 0.2150 
autocorrelation     
ρ1 0.036 -0.006 0.039 -0.040 
ρ2 0.017 0.060 0.081 0.037 
ρ3 0.039 -0.043 -0.037 0.021 
ρ4 -0.041 0.031 -0.001 0.025 
Ljung –Box Q5 16.081 10.444 10.671 11.221 
(p-value) 0.097 0.402 0.384 0.341 
     
Jarque -Bera 78.5048 282.4408 190.8569 40.2625 
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of weekly log returns on national stock indexes  
Returns KLSE 
(1994-2003) 
STRAITS 
(1991-2000) 
KOSPI 
(1991-2000) 
SET 
(1991-2000) 
TWSE 
(1991-2000) 
T ( No of weekly Return) 518 521 522 522 522 
Mean -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0000 
Standard Deviation 0.0166 0.0137 0.0195 0.0192 0.0172 
Skewness 0.4053 -0.4476 -0.0964 0.4283 -0.5432 
(SE) derived as (6/T)1/2 0.1073 0.1073          0.1072 0.1072 0.1072 
Excess-Kurtosis 10.143 14.8596 4.6574 4.6702 5.9657 
(SE) derived as (24/T)1/2 0.2152 0.2146 0.2144 0.2144 0.2144 
autocorrelation      
ρ1 0.036 0.064 -0.056 0.075 -0.050 
ρ2 0.085 0.030 0.052 0.141 0.090 
ρ3 -0.010 0.198 0.087 0.042 0.091 
ρ4 0.111 -0.196 0.048 -0.014 0.010 
ρ10 -0.091 0.017 0.058 -0.017 -0.029 
Ljung –Box Q5 25.55 31.073 13.877 19.426 12.064 
(p-value) 0.004 0.001 0.179 0.035 0.281 
      
Jarque -Bera 1115.434 3070.657 60.5582 76.632 216.9743 
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
Next, the paper analyses trends in ApEn during the crash period using a 12 weeks 
discrete observation window. The trends observed in table 3 shows a significant drop in 
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ApEn (2, 20%) during the crash period confirming the “tell-tale” sign of a crash. A low 
ApEn during the crash period indicates a high likelihood of repetitive patterns in return 
both during, pre and post crash zone. Further, the paper looks for more discriminating 
evidence to establish the incidence of bubble during the crash periods.  
 
 
Table 3: Trends in ApEn (2, 20%) during the crash events. 
US Crash 1987 
11th May -27th July 1997 0.4682
3rd Aug - 19th Oct 1987* 0.3871
2nd Nov - 11th Jan 1988 0.7455
 
Japan Crash Dec 1989 
4th Sep 89- 6th Nov 89 0.6762
13th Nov - 29th Jan 90* 0.3296
5th Feb -23rd  April  90 0.427
 
India Crash 2007-08 
27th Aug  - 12th Nov 2007 0.5544
19th Nov - 4th Feb 2007* 0.3871
11th Feb - 28th April 2008* 0.2197
5th May - 30 June 2008 0.3296
 
Note: * indicates the week containing the crash 
 
 
Crash Event Evidence:        
In order to examine the trends in approximate entropy an observation window of seven 
years is considered around the known crash period. The results presented in table 3 are 
based on the normalized ApEn (2, 20%) where the normalization is done with respect to 
the lowest value of ApEn during the sample period. Three years of post and pre crash 
period along with the crash is reported in table 4. There is a significant evidence of a 
decline on ApEn during and pre crash period. All the major crashes considered in our 
sample shows a very similar pattern in ApEn and figure 1 visually corroborates this trend 
for all the cases. However, it is important to note that for S&P, ApEn based analysis also 
points out an episode of speculative activities during 1990.   
 
Table 4: Trends in normalized ApEn (2, 20%) during the crash 
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 S &P  (1987) NIKKEI (1989) SENSEX (2007) 
T-3 1.066893512 1.130691607 1.101134601 
T-2 1.047018792 1.080072196 1.142437352 
T-1 1.065810842 1.068258266 1.093951514 
CRASH 1.002706674 1 1 
T+1 1.084834893 1.156862745  
T+2 1.031706751 1.077693002  
T+3 1 1.251210107  
 
 
A similar analysis is carried out for Asian crisis of 1997 and the results are reported in 
Table 5.  Seven major Asian indices are considered for this analysis which includes Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Japan. The normalized trend 
in ApEn reported in Table 5 (figure 2), however does not show a consistent pattern 
during the Asian crisis. The countries like Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan experience a 
significant drop in ApEn during 1997 crash, while, Hong Kong, Japan and Malaysia have 
experienced a major dip during 1994 or 1995. These results are consistent with the earlier 
findings that Asian stock returns do not conform to the predictions of the rational 
speculative bubbles model (Chan et al 1998).    
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Fig 1: Trends in normalized ApEn (2, 20%) during the crash. 
 
Table 5: Trends in normalized ApEn (2, 20%) during the crash 
 Hang Seng KLSE SET KOSPI TWSE NIKKEI STRAITS
T-3 1.0000 1.1009 1.0596 1.1187 1.0442 1.0000 1.0192 
T-2 1.1053 1.0000 1.1084 1.0637 1.1187 1.0526 1.0000 
T-1 1.1439 1.1059 1.1820 1.1804 1.0376 1.1683 1.0188 
CRASH 
(1997) 
1.0845 1.1813 1.0804 1.2047 1.0000 1.0342 1.0098 
T+1 1.1750 1.0978 1.0000 1.0000 1.0416 1.1151 1.1061 
T+2 1.0207 1.1395 1.1457 1.2379 1.1446 1.1626 1.0190 
T+3 1.1001 1.1192 1.0496 1.0954 1.1527 1.1198 1.0656 
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A series of robustness tests have been carried out using various duration window (m) and 
tolerance level (r) to check the stability of our conclusion. The trends in ApEn with 
different values of m that are presented in table 6A and B4 corroborates our conclusions. 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
HangSeng
SET
TWSE
STRAITS
0.9000
0.9500
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Year
1.2500
Norm
Index
Trends in ApEn(2,20%) during the Asian Crisis
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TWSE
NIKKEI
STRAITS
                                                 
4 A similar exercise is carried out for different values of r. Since our findings are consistent across various 
values of r and m we only report one set of results. 
A Case Study of a developing Market, India:  
As mentioned earlier the study of speculative bubbles has gained renewed 
importance in the context of developing economies. Despite significant developments, 
which have put these markets almost at par with the best in the world (in terms of their 
structure, systems and regulation), the markets still have witnessed several bouts of 
speculative activities in recent times and hence provides an unique opportunity to test the 
power of ApEn in identifying speculative bubble episodes from other anomalies driven 
by forces    such as scams or changes in political scenarios.  
 
Fig 2: Trends in normalized ApEn (2, 20%) during the 1997 Asian crash 
 
 
Table 6A: Trends in normalized ApEn (2, 20%) during the crash 
 
SENSEX 
 
S&P500   HANGSENG NIKKEI 
Year 
m=2                m=4 m=6 m=8 m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8
1 1.36                1.35 1.28 1.30 1.20 1.19 1.17 1.16 1.24 1.22 1.23 1.21 1.41 1.40 1.43 1.39
2 1.26                1.22 1.23 1.27 1.32 1.32 1.30 1.26 1.35 1.34 1.33 1.28 1.31 1.31 1.32 1.27
3 1.47                1.41 1.43 1.42 1.32 1.31 1.28 1.25 1.24 1.19 1.15 1.11 1.53 1.50 1.45 1.36
4 1.33                1.32 1.28 1.23 1.38 1.35 1.32 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.26 1.28 1.23 1.20 1.21 1.26
5 1.35                1.33 1.36 1.33 1.35 1.34 1.29 1.26 1.37 1.32 1.30 1.25 1.30 1.32 1.25 1.24
6 1.45                1.41 1.38 1.33 1.38 1.38 1.34 1.29 1.42 1.36 1.30 1.31 1.44 1.36 1.34 1.29
7 1.35                1.34 1.28 1.30 1.30 1.27 1.26 1.26 1.35 1.29 1.27 1.22 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.22
8 1.40                1.32 1.28 1.25 1.40 1.42 1.42 1.35 1.46 1.46 1.43 1.46 1.37 1.35 1.32 1.31
9 1.34                1.29 1.29 1.22 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.29 1.27 1.24 1.22 1.16 1.43 1.42 1.41 1.40
10 1.23                1.23 1.24 1.25 1.29 1.28 1.21 1.19 1.37 1.36 1.35 1.31 1.38 1.31 1.27 1.28
Note: **SENSEX (1998-2007), S&P500 (1981-1990), HANGSENG (1991-2000), NIKKEI (1991-2000) 
 
Table 6B: Trends in normalized ApEn (2, 20%) during the crash 
KLSE 
 
STRAITS 
 
KOSPI 
 
SET 
 
TWSE 
 
Year 
m=2                    m=4 m=6 m=8 m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8 m=2 m=4 m=6 m=8
1 1.35                    1.34 1.31 1.25 1.36 1.35 1.36 1.30 1.30 1.28 1.22 1.23 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.24 1.40 1.37 1.35 1.31
2 1.23                    1.21 1.16 1.17 1.38 1.37 1.34 1.36 1.19 1.18 1.13 1.11 1.31 1.30 1.23 1.18 1.49 1.45 1.43 1.39
3 1.36                    1.31 1.32 1.28 1.29 1.28 1.28 1.32 1.45 1.42 1.41 1.40 1.33 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.25 1.21 1.26 1.25
4 1.45                    1.41 1.38 1.36 1.35 1.29 1.25 1.19 1.32 1.29 1.30 1.28 1.34 1.36 1.29 1.30 1.34 1.33 1.30 1.29
5 1.35                    1.38 1.33 1.31 1.32 1.28 1.29 1.24 1.26 1.21 1.25 1.24 1.40 1.33 1.35 1.33 1.43 1.39 1.43 1.37
6 1.40                    1.34 1.32 1.28 1.35 1.29 1.27 1.23 1.40 1.40 1.36 1.37 1.49 1.47 1.47 1.45 1.33 1.34 1.24 1.22
7 1.37                    1.34 1.36 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.43 1.44 1.43 1.40 1.36 1.31 1.27 1.24 1.28 1.25 1.19 1.17
8 1.36                    1.36 1.32 1.25 1.46 1.44 1.44 1.38 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.16 1.26 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.33 1.28 1.30 1.32
9 1.27                    1.32 1.26 1.24 1.35 1.29 1.24 1.20 1.47 1.44 1.38 1.32 1.44 1.42 1.39 1.32 1.46 1.43 1.39 1.37
10 1.36                    1.35 1.38 1.37 1.41 1.36 1.34 1.32 1.30 1.23 1.24 1.21 1.32 1.30 1.33 1.32 1.48 1.46 1.41 1.36
  Note: **KLSE (1994-2003), STRAITS (1991-2000), KOSPI (1991-2000), SET (1991-2000), TWSE (1991-2000)
 There are two episodes of crash in the Indian market that attract special attentions: The 
first episode considered by the common press as a potential bubble occurred between late 
2007 and early 2008 during which several bouts of extreme movements were witnessed. 
The first incident during this period occurred on October 17, 2007, when the Sensex 
plunged by 1,743 points, the largest fall in a single day in our sample period. The Sensex 
hit a low of 17,307.90 points within minutes of opening and trading was suspended in the 
market for an hour. The markets had crashed on the wake of Securities and Exchange 
Board of India's (SEBI) proposal to tighten the rules for purchase of shares and bonds in 
Indian companies through the participatory note (PN) route. However, the Sensex 
recovered sharply from the day's low (17,308 points) and touched an intra-day high of 
18,841 points - up 1,533 points (8.9%) from the day's low. The Sensex finally ended with 
a loss of 336 points (1.8%) at 18,716.Further, on Jan 21, 2008 Sensex saw the highest 
ever loss of 1,408 points at the end of the session, the biggest ever loss in the absolute 
term and also the first ever four digit loss for the index at close. The Sensex recovered to 
close at 17,605 points.  On the following day, the Sensex saw its biggest intra-day fall 
when it hit a low of 15,332, down 2,273 points. Trading was suspended for one hour at 
the Bombay Stock Exchange after the benchmark Sensex crashed to a low of 15,576.30 
within minutes of opening, crossing the circuit limit of 10 per cent. 
The second episode of interest occurred on May 17, 2004 when the Sensex dropped by 
565 points, its third biggest fall ever, to close at 4,505. The Sensex witnessed its second-
biggest intra-day fall of 842 points, twice attracting suspension of trading due to change 
in political scenario as coalition government with the help of communist parties came to 
power.  
These two episodes of market crashes provide a unique opportunity to test the power of 
ApEn as the underlying factors influencing these market crashes are very different and 
ApEn should be able to discriminate between these two episodes. As we have 
hypothesized in this paper, we should expect substantially lower level of ApEn during the 
2007-08 crash as these events are often identified by the common press as bubble. In 
contrast, 2004 crash is purely driven by political events and might not have any 
speculative component to it.  
Table 7 reports the normalized trend in ApEn (2, 20%) during these two episodes of crash 
and as expected ApEn during 2007 is substantially lower than the 2004 value, and it is 
also lowest in the decade providing a strong “tale-tell” sign of speculative bubble during 
2007-2008.  
  
 
Table 7: Trends in normalized ApEn (2, 20%) for Sensex 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1.113 1.024 1.196 1.085 1.102 1.184 1.101 1.142 1.093 1
 
 
 
 
 
   4. CONCLUSION 
 
The paper brings out certain regularities characterized by low ApEn level during many of 
the major crash events in the several markets including both developed and emerging 
economies. In addition, the paper also investigates the 1997 Asian crisis using weekly 
data for seven major Asian indices which includes Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Japan. Further, using a case study of SENSEX we also 
demonstrate the ability of ApEn to differentiate the speculative bubble from other market 
crashes.   
 
Though this study primarily focuses on crash events, it can be extended to provide an 
early warning system that would enable investors and agents to be aware of the realities 
of price movements in the stock market and prevent them from attributing all increasing 
stock prices to the fundamentals. An early detection of an evolving bubble characterized 
by a steep fall in ApEn within a very short interval would immensely help both investors 
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and policy makers as they can intervene and correct the market anomalies 
instantaneously, thereby preventing an otherwise inevitable market crash. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that ApEn has certain weaknesses due to its dependence on 
sequence length (m) and its poor self consistency. Though the paper has addressed many 
of these shortcomings through specific robustness tests, further research using other 
alternative statistical measures in the spirit of ApEn (e.g., Sample Entropy) would 
provide a more robust understanding of the rational speculative bubbles.  
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